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The articles in this special issue challenge readers to reconsider the relationships among 
individual mobility, collective action, and social change. Taken together, they reveal an 
increasing and broadening interest in the concept of social change and raise important 
questions about its societal applications. In this commentary, we expand on this rich body of 
research by considering how surface indicators of (lack of) social change such as individual 
versus collective action may be related to a wider range of motives than has been assumed. 
Moreover, we consider more carefully what constitutes social change, and discuss different 
forms of equality as a means to conceptualizing social change. In doing so we attempt to 
move beyond implied dichotomies between individual and collective strategies and actions to 




 Broadening perspectives on achieving social change 
The past decade has revealed a growing interest in social psychologists to study social 
change from an intergroup perspective. Much of this work has focused on collective actions 
by disadvantaged group members to improve their position by, for example, engaging in 
demonstrations, signing petitions or other forms of collectively motivated actions against the 
status quo (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009; see also Reicher, 2004; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; 
van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2010, for reviews). However, there has been 
relatively less attention paid to other potential avenues to social change that are quieter, less 
explicitly ‘collective’, either because the actions that produce change may not be motivated 
by the desire to improve the position of one’s low-status group, or because they take place in 
relative isolation of the group. For instance, compared to 30 years ago, more individual 
members of ethnic minority groups hold leadership positions in organizations and their 
presence there, in and of itself, may represent meaningful social change. In addition, once 
there, these members of traditionally disadvantaged groups may, through their interactions 
with others, accelerate that change.  For example, women in top positions routinely mentor 
younger women. Although individual advancement appears to have reduced intergroup 
inequality (at least for some), within social psychology, and the field of intergroup relations 
more specifically, such efforts to gain personal access to positions of advantage are often 
described as impediments to social change. Need this always be the case? In line with this 
special issue’s focus on how both the individual and collective actions can induce social 
change, this commentary will address two themes. First, we discuss the meaning we attach to 
individual actions (such as personal advancement) and challenge the idea that they necessarily 
impede social change. Second, we raise the question of what constitutes successful social 
change.  
Individual versus Collective Action 
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Members of low status groups can ‘engage’ in a number of responses when they 
experience disadvantage. Whereas some might resign themselves to their fate, others might 
try to improve their personal situation (e.g., via personal advancement), while others might 
attempt to improve the position of the group as a whole (i.e., collective action; see Ellemers, 
Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Researchers in the 
social identity tradition have typically conceptualized attempts at improving one’s personal 
situation as “individual mobility,” and suggested that it involves physically leaving or 
psychologically distancing oneself from one’s low-status group.  As such, it has been 
identified as a strategy that can undermine broader social change.  For example, Wright and 
Taylor (1999) found that successful tokens (i.e., low-status group members who moved into a 
higher status group through individual mobility), while recognizing that the low status of their 
former group as unjust, were nonetheless less likely to support actions to address this injustice 
than group members who remained in a disadvantaged position. Similarly, Ellemers, Derks 
and colleagues (e.g., Derks, van Laar, Ellemers & Raghoe, in press; Ellemers, Van den 
Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass & Bonvini, 2004) have shown that both women and ethnic minority 
group members who achieve high status positions in organizations often distance themselves 
from their low-status ingroup, and that women become so called “queen bees,” actively 
impeding the movement of other women to higher level positions. Moreover, the presence of 
token members of the disadvantaged group in high status positions, or other evidence that 
individuals are mobile, can decrease support for social change both in members of the low 
and the high status group (e.g., Eibach & Ehrlinger, 2006; Kaiser, Drury, Spalding, Cheryan, 
& O’Brien, 2009; Richards & Wright, 2010).  
These individual actions, that seem motivated by personal motives (e.g., advancement) 
only, are often contrasted with ‘collective action’ which is seen as the key to creating social 
change – change that will reduce the inequality between social groups (see Wright, 2010). 
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Broadly defined, collective action refers to any action in which a group member acts as a 
representative of his/her group with the goal of improving the conditions of the group as a 
whole (Wright, et al., 1990). Interestingly, Dixon and colleagues (in press), in this special 
issue discuss South African data showing that political solidarity between two or more 
historically disadvantaged groups can induce social change as disadvantaged groups support 
each other in their efforts to gain access to resources of the high status group. Yet generally, 
one of the critical motivators of collective action is a clear and focused attachment to the 
specific ingroup and strong ingroup-motivated effort against the existent status relations.  
Although it has been clearly shown that a focus on individual mobility can lead 
attention away from, or shroud evidence of, collective injustices and thus reduce collective 
efforts for social change, some of the work in the current issue suggests that this might not 
always be the case. First, we argue that ‘individual’ action (such as personal advancement) 
need not always indicate an underlying motive to “leave” the group either physically or 
psychologically. Second, we question whether actions need always be collectively motivated 
in order to successfully create social change.  
How Well Do Individual versus Collective Actions Reveal Underlying Motives? 
The distinction between individual versus collective behavior derives from a social 
identity approach which sees behavior as ranging on a continuum from those guided by 
exclusively personal/individual identities to those guided exclusively by collective identities 
(Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As part of their Self-Categorization Theory, Turner and 
colleagues (1987) further posited the idea of functional antagonism between individual and 
collective identities, such that in a given context either personal or collective identity will 
become the salient and primary driver of both self-representation and behavior.  This has led 
to a focus on contrasting personal with collective identities and individual with collective 
types of behavior. Thus, in the context of social change research, individual mobility 
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strategies are often contrasted with collective actions (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1993; Wright et al., 
1990). However, it has become increasingly evident that this view of the personal and 
collective identity as antagonistic may represent the nature and function of identity too 
narrowly (e.g., Spears, 2001; Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012). 
Similarly, in evaluating motives for participation in collective action it has been 
acknowledged that these may be collective (to improve position of one’s group) and/or 
personal (e.g., a cost-benefit analysis of personal gains and losses related to participation; see 
Stürmer & Simon, 2004). With the less antagonistic representation of the personal and 
collective identity, it is perhaps not surprising then that Becker and colleagues (Becker, 
Barreto, & Kahn, in press), show in this issue that targets of discrimination can respond to 
experiences of discrimination by engaging in both individual and collective actions 
simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, building on this early work, the motives that people can have in the face 
of disadvantage are often deduced by contrasting the types of individual versus collective 
actions people engage in. For example, early work by Wright and colleagues (1990) 
considered whether low-status group members collectively protested their low-status 
(indicating group improvement motives), tried to leave their low-status group (indicating 
personal advancement motives) or did nothing (indicating acceptance of their fate). While this 
approach has proven useful, this kind of direct interpretation of actions at face value, may lead 
us to ignore a wider range of motives that may underlie each of these different responses by 
members of disadvantaged groups. Indeed, in the present issue, Leach and Livingstone (in 
press) propose that what is seen as supposed ‘acceptance’ of one’s low-status, such as 
favoring the outgroup above one’s own group, might actually be a form of resistance. For 
example, when women appear to agree with gender stereotypes, describing men as more 
agentic and women as more communal, we need not assume that women consider agency as a 
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positive characteristic. Moreover, endorsement of this male stereotype need not also mean 
acceptance of the current power relations. We believe that this tendency to interpret behaviour 
at face value rather than considering a range of possible underlying motives is not only 
important in terms of understanding the full psychological meaning of a given action choice, 
but may also limit the kinds of behaviors we have traditionally seen as particularly conducive 
to social change. 
Motives Underlying Individual Advancement.  Applying this call to consider the 
broader psychological meaning of a given form of action to the specific case of individual 
mobility could reveal underlying motives that are indeed more collective.  Given the accepted 
view of individual mobility as the abandonment of the ingroup or joining of the outgroup, it is 
not surprising that attempts to improve one’s personal position would be understood as 
evidence of a lack of commitment to the low-status ingroup. And, again there is clear 
evidence that this assumption has merit (e.g., Derks, et al., in press; Ellemers et al., 2004). 
However, there may be reasons to challenge its universality. Wright and Taylor’s (1999) work 
showed that successful individual mobility of token group members undermined subsequent 
support for collective action by the low-status group. Yet, interestingly, this lack of support 
had less to do with distancing from the low-status ingroup, and more to do with their growing 
identification with their new high-status ingroup.  
Kulich and colleagues (in press) come to a similar conclusion based on their work on 
how members of low-status groups deal with identity conflict emerging from their belonging 
to both an inherited low-status group (e.g., women, racial/ethnic minority) and an achieved 
high-status group (e.g., professional status). They conclude that, although achieving high 
professional status tends to be associated with less support for one’s low-status gender or 
racial/ethnic group, this may be due to increased identification with the high-status group 
(e.g., profession) rather than decreased identification with the low-status group.  
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Even stronger evidence that personal advancement can, at times, be coupled with a 
motivation to support the ingroup is provided by Derks and colleagues (Derks et al., in press; 
Derks, van Laar, Ellemers, & de Groot, 2011), who show that those members of low-status 
groups who identify highly, and perceive their ingroup to be threatened, may respond to 
personal advancement into a high-status position, by engaging in ingroup promoting behavior 
such as actively mentoring ingroup members within their organization. Thus, it appears that 
individual mobility need not always be associated with ingroup distancing motives. 
Motives Underlying Collective Action. It is fairly well established that in general 
high identifiers are more likely to recognize subtle disadvantages against their group, to be 
loyal to their group, to join social movements and to engage in collective action (Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003; van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008). As Becker and colleagues (in press) discuss in this issue, those who lack any 
relation with their group, disidentifiers, are more likely not to act against discrimination in the 
form of sexist comments. Yet, it may be worth considering possible qualifiers of this 
relationship between ingroup identification and collective action. Indeed, Jimenez and 
colleagues (Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, in press) provide an 
example of when low ingroup identifiers may be more likely than high identifiers to instigate 
social change. At times high identifiers may be bound by concerns about maintaining the 
group’s image and thus may be more careful in the types of actions they are willing to take. 
Consequently, they may not participate in non-normative actions that they believe could 
damage the group’s image. By contrast, low identifiers are freer of such concerns and may 
thus be more willing to engage in more radical forms of collective action. To the degree that 
these radical actions can be part of an effective campaign for social change, this work offers 
one case where strong ingroup identification may not be a strong precursor to social change.   
Similarly, making salient a superordinate (common ingroup) identity that includes 
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both the low-status ingroup and the high-status outgroup has been described as a strategy that, 
although able to improve intergroup attitudes (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), can reduce 
collective action (e.g., Wright & Lubensky, 2009). This is thought to occur because the salient 
superordinate identity reduces identification with the ingroup.  However, Górska and Bilewicz 
(in press), present a case where making salient a superodinate identity may not have this 
effect.  They show that low-status group members who perceived high levels of group-based 
deprivation (i.e., the Polish LGBTQ community) respond to a manipulation that makes salient 
a superordinate identity (i.e., the Polish national identity) with greater ingroup pride and 
stronger support for collective action to induce social change. These findings are reminiscent 
of Mummendey and colleagues (e.g., Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) work on ingroup 
projection in which they warn that making salient a superordinate category will not always 
lead to more positive and benign intergroup relations.  Instead, they point out that this 
common ingroup identity can be a source of controversy and conflict as the two groups seek 
to define the character of the common ingroup as more consistent with their own smaller 
subgroup (and thus less consistent with outgroup).  It seems reasonable that one way of 
contesting of the common ingroup identity may be collective action on the part of low-status 
groups. Although somewhat different from the previous example where low identification 
produced more collective action (Jiménez-Moya et al., in press), both of these findings 
strongly suggest that we consider more complex and nuanced models of the relationships 
between group identification, collective action and social change. 
Individual Mobility and Social Change?: Evolutionary vs. Revolutionary Change. 
Beyond this evidence that the relationship between ingroup identification, individual 
mobility and collective action may be more complicated than simple applications of the social 
identity approach might imply, we would like to propose that individual mobility might also 
play a more productive role in social change. 
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Collective and Individual Action as Collaborators in Social Change.  We may also 
want to remind ourselves that social change is evaluated by the degree to which group-based 
inequality and structural and interpersonal discrimination is reduced, not by the means by 
which this happens. Although strategic collective action may be a very important means of 
achieving these ends, it is likely not the only means. Changing the demographics of those who 
hold high-status positions, by whatever means, should lead to changes in the perceptions of 
who belongs in these high-status groups. For example, a generation ago the prototypic 
representation of a medical doctor in North America was almost certainly a man.  However, in 
2013, women outnumber men in almost all Canadian medical schools and in the United States 
more the 70% of the graduates from programs in family medicine are women.  Thus, to the 
degree that our prototypes are determined by our direct experiences a child growing up in 
North America will be much less likely to imagine that a doctor should be a man.  Of course, 
these kinds of changes in the demographic of high-status professions like medical doctors owe 
a great deal to successful collective action.  However, it seems unreasonable to claim that they 
owe nothing to the active efforts of individual women pursuing their own personal ambitions 
and desires for individual mobility.  In fact, vigorous individual action may be essential for 
the opportunities offered by successful collective actions to be realized – even as collective 
action pushes the doors open, upward mobility efforts by individual minorities and women 
may be the only way that anyone can walk through those doors.  
Further, as our example of the prototype of medical doctors implies, individual 
mobility efforts that contribute to changing the look of groups that were historically the 
province only of privileged groups now offers its own source of social change. The strong 
presence of women and minorities in a high-status group changes the shared expectations and 
beliefs about who can occupy positions of authority, power and status. And as these beliefs 
and expectations change, society evolves to be closer to the world imagined by those who 
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vigorously engaged in collective action.   
Further, while the recently advanced arguments that cross-group contact can be 
problematic for collective action (e.g., Tausch et al., in press) are certainly an important 
advancement, it is worth recalling that even some of the earliest elaborations of this idea  
recognized that the contradiction need not be inevitable (see Wright & Lubensky, 2009), and 
some even propose specific solutions.  In the spirit of these solutions, we propose that there 
may be two ways in which the cross-group contact that should result as low-status group 
members move up the social hierarchy might actually increase collective action participation.  
First, it may be that the contact that results from individual mobility may actually serve to 
highlight the group-based inequalities that exist (see Poore, Gagne, Barlow, Lydon, Taylor, & 
Wright, 2002) and increase the sense that a group-based response is necessary. So, while 
some successful members of the low-status group may respond to the difficulties they face by 
becoming “queen bees”, others may be made more radical as they awaken to the inequalities 
they now experience very personally (see Crosby & Ropp, 2006). Second, these cross-group 
contacts need not always be negative. Tausch and colleagues (in press) present research in this 
issue that reveals that, in some cases, forming cross-group friendships (positive contact) can 
increase interest in individual mobility while not reducing motivation for collective action. It 
may even be possible that personal movement onto a high-status position offers an 
opportunity for low-status group members to seek out and find high-status group members 
who are explicitly supportive of the low-status  group’s struggle. Forming relationships with 
these people – advantaged group allies – could not only strengthen the psychological 
underpinnings of collective action (see Droogendyk, Louis & Wright, 2014), but could also 
create an opportunity for forming coalitions that would enhance, rather than undermine, 
collective action (see Subašić, Reynolds & Turner, 2008).    
Of course, we recognize that there are clear political problems with this alternative 
12 
 
representations of individual action as social change – “just work hard and ignore 
discrimination and eventually enough of your group will get ahead and everything will be 
fair.” Ignoring the effects of tokenism, queen bee effects and legitimizing ideologies that 
promote individual over collective action, would be clearly problematic. All of these serve to 
support unequal systems. However, we also believe that the exclusive focus on the contrast 
between individual and collective actions may limit our understanding of social change. 
Perhaps it is time to consider how individual and collective strategies may, at times, be 
complementary and may both result in social change.  
Conceptualizing Social Change 
Studying how individual and collective strategies induce social change requires a clear 
conceptualization of social change. Collective action may be a catalyst for social change, but 
it is important not to equate collective action with social change. Collective action can be 
ineffective or could even lead to material losses for the low-status group. Thus, determining 
the outcome of collective action in terms of social change is distinct from the question of what 
produces collective action in the first place (McGarty, Lala, Thomas, Smith, & Bliuc, 2013).  
Although the number of social psychological studies on social change has increased, 
few specify what actually constitutes social change (but see Louis, 2009; Sweetman, Leach, 
Spears, & Saab, 2013). The introduction of this special issue offers the following broad 
definition: “a change in intergroup relations to reflect greater social equality”. Yet this 
definition remains imprecise in that it leaves open the meaning of social equality. We propose 
that two elements define social (in)equality – structural/material and status inequality – and 
reductions in either might be considered evidence of social change.  
Structural (or material) inequality refers to differences in opportunities, resources, wealth 
and other tangible outcomes. In the stigma literature this type of inequality is referred to as 
objective disadvantage (e.g., Major & O’Brien, 2005). An example of structural inequality is 
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the lower pay of women compared to men (e.g., Barreto, Ellemers, Cihangir, & Stroebe, 
2009). A focus on this kind of inequality implies that social change occurs only when we can 
see measurable improvements in the material conditions of the low-status  group (e.g., women 
and men’s pay being more equal).  Status inequality refers to the perceived position and value 
of the low-status compared to the high-status group. An example of status inequality would be 
the broadly held stereotypes about men (and women) that imply men have characteristics that 
are more valuable in the workplace. This definition of inequality implies that social change is 
achieved when the attitudes and beliefs about the low- and high-status groups have changed 
such that the two groups are evaluated more equally. Thus, when a low-status group is more 
respected or valued by the high-status group this would demonstrate social change - even in 
the absence of changes in structural inequality. For example, work by Saguy and colleagues 
(e.g., Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009) reveals that when high and low status group 
members focus on what they have in common, rather than how they are different, this leads 
high-status group members to hold more positive attitudes towards the low-status group thus 
reducing status inequality. Yet, it appears to have little effect on structural inequality, as the 
advantaged group continues to offer the low-status group an unequal share of resources. By 
contrast, as illustrated by Hansen (in press) in this special issue, an intervention by which 
women in a developing country are given resources and training that improves their financial 
position relative to men –reducing structural inequality - may, in the long run, also reduce 
status inequality as male and female perceptions of gender relations change such that women 
as a group are seen as more valued and deserving of greater respect.  
A conceptualization of social change as increasing structural and/or status equality raises a 
number of interesting questions. For example, are both status and structural equality needed to 
achieve true social change? The immediate answer appears to be “no.” However, we propose 
that sustainable and long-lasting social change probably involves both status and structural 
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equality. Historical examples of successful social change movements (e.g., women’s rights 
movements) seem to include both attitude change (e.g., ‘women can be excellent leaders’) as 
well as material changes (e.g., almost 50% of the students graduating from medical school in 
the USA are now women). This distinction also makes apparent questions about whether (and 
how) reductions in one form of inequality might influence the other.  In the examples above, 
the work by Hansen (in press) seems to demonstrate that changes in structural inequality are a 
catalyst for changes in status inequality, while the work by Saguy and colleagues (2009) 
implies that changes in status inequality may not be a catalyst for changes in structural 
inequality.  However, it is likely that the relationship between structural versus status equality 
and social change is much more nuanced and context dependent than just described. 
Conclusions 
In this commentary, we have attempted to challenge readers to think about the 
meaning of key concepts and to seek a more nuanced and complex model of the psychology 
of social change. We have focused on two themes that are raised more or less explicitly in 
many of the papers in this special issue: What ‘strategies’ by low-status group members 
undermine or produce social change and why?; and What is social change? In answering these 
questions we have recognized the importance of collective action as a catalyst for social 
change but have also challenged the idea that it is only through collectively motivated action 
that social change will occur and that individual mobility is always antagonistic to broader 
social change. We also consider what constitutes social change, a concept that, although often 
discussed, has rarely been explicitly defined. We suggest that a more careful consideration of 
what constitutes social change is necessary and that any conception of social change needs to 
be distinguished from the behaviours that may (or may not) create it (e.g., collective action or 
individual mobility).  Without a well-articulated understanding of what social change is, it 
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